Dawn: Cooperation, not Control by May, Todd
On September 27, 2007, a Delta I1 rocket carrying the Dawn spacecraft lifted off from Kennedy 
Space Center. Part of NASAs Discovery program, the $370 million Dawn mission began its 
three-billion-mile voyage to the asteroid belt to study the asteroid Vesta and Ceres, a dwarf planet. 
The spacecraft is scheduled to reach Vesta in 2011. After spending nine months measuring the 
composition, shape, and topography of that body, it will travel a billion miles to carry out a similar 
analysis of Ceres in 2015. 
As manager of NASA's Discovery and New Frontiers program what to do and, to a large extent, how to do it-end of story. 
at Marshall Space Flight Center, I had oversight responsibility When we formulated the Discovery and New Frontiers 
for Dawn, which the Jet Propulsion Laboratory UPL) was program, however, we decided to take a different tack. All 
managing while developing the spacecraft with Orbital Sciences our projects were developed either by JPL or Johns Hopkins 
Corporation. Over the years, Marshall has had a reputation University's Applied Physics Laboratory (APL). We knew these 
for taking a command-and-control approach to program and organizations actually knew what to do and how to do it. While 
project management: tell the project institutions or contractors the responsibility for mission development lies squarely with the 
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project, we in the program office could make real contributions 
to problem solving and decision making, and we could bring 
technical expertise to bear when needed. We would not impose 
Marshall's specific set of "how-to" rules on them. Instead, we 
wanted to focus our energies almost entirely on enabling and 
supporting the success of these project teams. 
We strove for trust and mutual respect, not control. It 
was an uphill battle at first, and there were some folks who 
frankly just didn't trust our intentions. It took six months of 
demonstrating by our actions that we really were committed to 
this approach and were there to help. We had to earn their trust. 
I distinctly remember the day I knew the approach had worked. 
I walked into my office and found a yellow sticky note on my 
desk: Charles Elachi, director of JPL, wanted to talk to me. I 
picked up the phone and returned his call. He explained he had 
been a skeptic about the Discovery Program Office, but he had 
been won over by numerous reports from his staff and project 
managers that the office had helped them in some way. 
Trust and cooperation build on each other; genuine 
cooperation creates more trust, which leads to more cooperation. 
Several months after that conversation, when APL ran into a 
late-breaking problem with their autonomy system on the New 
Horizons project (the onboard system for handling anomalies 
independent of instructions from mission operations), JPL 
offered up one of their most senior directors to lend a hand. He 
traveled to APL and stayed there for three weeks, rolled up his 
sleeves, and helped them solve the problem. 
Ion Propulsion 
Dawn's long, complex journey is made possible by the spacecraft's 
extremely efficient, futuristic ion propulsion system. Xenon ions 
expelled at high speed provide thrust. Their speed is high-about 
25 miles per second-but their mass is low, so the amount of 
thrust is miniscule compared with conventional rocket engines. It 
is about the same force as that applied by a single sheet of typing 
paper resting on your hand. At full throttle, it would take one of 
Dawn's three ion engines four days to accelerate the spacecraft from 
0 to 60 miles per hour. But the engines can operate for extremely 
long periods of time. (They are expected to fire for more than 
five years over the course of the mission.) One of Dawn's engines 
operating continuously for one year uses only fifteen gallons of 
fuel to increase the spacecraft's speed by 5,500 miles per hour. 
Artist concept of the Dawn spacecraft after launch. 
Deep Space 1, launched in 1998, was the first and only 
other NASA mission to use ion propulsion, so there were still 
technological and developmental hurdles to overcome for Dawn. 
Developing the system presented several engineering challenges 
that were also management challenges. One of the engineering 
challenges facing the JPL engineers working on Dawn was to 
understand the behavior ofthe nearly 1,000 pounds ofxenon the 
engines required when the Delta 11 rocket's third stage spun. 
Most spacecraft do not have difficulty sensing post-separation 
spin rates while the propellant and spacecraft are exchanging 
angular momentum. For Dawn, however, the heritage gyros 
of the spacecraft attitude control system saturated at too low 
a spin rate for this problem. Since a significant fraction of the 
flight system's moment of inertia was in the xenon propellant, 
and given the low-saturation rate of the gyros, it was critical 
to mission success to understand the xenon spin behavior. If 
- 
the attitude control system was activated while the gyros were 
saturated, the hydrazine propellant needed for the mission 
would have been expended in the first minutes of the mission, 
resulting in mission failure. 
- 
JPL engineers had no previous relevant experience to help 
- 
them understand the potential problem. Success came from 
not simply identifying and assigning blame for the problem 
or taking control of it away from the group trying to solve it, 
but instead from focusing on how to help them succeed. The 
Discovery Program office immediately-offered engineers at 
Marshall a number of lessons about propellant slosh dynamics of 
superfluid helium learned while working on the Gravity Probe B 
project. This gave JPL engineers the support they needed to 
develop analysis and test techniques to resolve the problem. 
Later, the xenon tank failed during qualification testing. 
The failure occurred just below the qualifying pressure, 
though-significantly higher than the nominal operating 
pressure. Focusing on the goal of mission success rather than 
the letter of the law of requirements, the Discovery Program 
Office gabbed pressure vessel experts and worked alongside the 
project to develop the recommendations and rationale to lower 
> 
the operating pressure while maintaining mission performance 
requirements. This avoided the significant delay and expense 
redesigning, rebuilding, and requalifying the tank, which was 
already installed on the vehicle, would have caused. 
Launch Delays 
After a couple other assignments, I rejoined Dawn as deputy 
associate administrator for programs in NASA Headquarters' 
Science Mission Directorate. In this role, I chaired the Program 
Management Council (PMC) that provided the recommendation 
to the associate administrator to proceed with final launch 
preparations. Dawn was scheduled for launch between June 20 
and July 10, 2007, which, from four months out, seemed a 
reasonably generous launch window. Consequently, I was bullish 
on our ability to launch in this timeframe. After the PMC, I put 
out a press release announcing that we were "full steam ahead." 
But as always seems to be the case, Murphy was right, and we 
learned the hard way how seemingly minor circumstances and 
delays can cascade into major problems. It's like the old saying: 
"For want of a nail, the shoe was lost; for want of a shoe, the horse 
was lost; for want of a horse, the rider was lost . . ." and so on. 
In Dawn's case, what seemed like a relatively benign ten- 
day slip in the delivery of the second stage fuel tank cascaded 
into what Steve Francois, the Launch Services Program manager 
at Kennedy Space Center, called "the perfect storm." What 
happened? Here's a sampling. 
The P3 Orion surveillance aircraft, which was ready 
to provide telemetry during the original launch period, had 
another commitment during the new launch window dates. We 
purchased the services of a navy ship that could sail to the eastern 
Atlantic to receive the telemetry, but it had mechanical problems, 
ran into twelve-foot sea swells and unfavorable ocean currents, 
and failed to get to the location on schedule. We ordered up 
yet another telemetry aircraft, Big Crow, which also developed 
mechanical problems and could not get to its deployment 
station. We encountered a crane failure from a simple bearing 
that cost another week. Then there was the weather. 
In July at the Cape it's common for afternoon thunderstorms 
to develop and force transportation and fueling delays. We 
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At Astrotech, workers check the Dawn spacecraft after testing the deployment 
of its more than 32-foot-long solarpanels on one side. 
encountered a stationary weather front that sat on us for several 
weeks. Our slipping schedule began to impinge on the planned 
launch date for Phoenix, cutting into the time required between 
launches. Since Phoenix was aMars mission, missing their launch 
window would cause an unacceptable two-year delay and cost 
hundreds of millions of dollars, so their schedule needed to take 
priority over ours. As we neared the fish-or-cut-bait point, the 
frequency and intensity of discussions increased dramatically. 
The odds were increasingly against successfully launching both 
Dawn and Phoenix within their windows. Discussions were 
elevated to the highest levels in the Agency, and our governance 
model was once again tested when there was disagreement as to 
whether the requirements for telemetry could be waived entirely. 
The right decision was made in the end, but it was a tough call. 
When the dust from "the perfect storm" settled, we ended up 
slipping the launch to a new window several months down the 
road at a cost of more than $25 million. 
I drew two conclusions from this experience. One is a 
reinforcement of the need to maintain vigilance in examining 
the potential downstream repercussions of seemingly small 
issues. The other is that it is important to know when to fold 'em. 
You need to look at your situation realistically and objectively 
assess the risks without personal bias. When circumstances 
demand it, give up the effort to launch at the earliest possible 
date, as hard as that is to do and as much as that may feel like 
a failure. Temporarily standing down the Dawn launch was a 
tough decision, but it was the right one. 
quality and success. Emphasize commander's intent over 
rudder control; let them know where you want to go and 
when you want to be there, then let them figure out how 
to get there. 
Open and honest discussion of issues is essential. People fill 
the void of the unknown with their worst fears. Get folks 
around the table and have open, honest, and frank dialogue. 
I've seldom seen this fail to get to the root of issues. 
You have to earn your seat at the table, proving that you 
are competent, trustworthy, and dedicated to the success 
of the mission. 
Know when to fold 'em. Your pride can get rolled up in 
making a milestone or launch date, but you have to make 
a judgment based on the realities of the situation and 
not wear down the team trying to meet an increasingly 
impossible deadline. 
The NASA governance model that gives a voice to the 
concerns of engineers and safety experts works-trust it 
and use it. 
Successful Launch 
Dawn finally launched successfully-at dawn-on 
September 27, 2007. By November 14, while the spacecraft 
traveled away from Earth, controllers at JPL completed testing 
the ion propulsion system. The craft began long-term thrusting 
for its interplanetary travels in mid-December and will reach 
Vesta in a little fewer than four years. 
The Important Lessons 
The demands of Dawn and other challenging missions I've 
been involved with have taught me some important lessons 
for successful program and project management. As far as I'm 
concerned, these are the main ones: 
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